A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

Ivo Friedberg, David Laverty, Kieran McLaughlin, Paul Smith

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Abstract

Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids – a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015
PublisherBCS Learning & Development Ltd
Pages52-62
Number of pages11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Sep 2015
Event3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 - University of Applied Sciences, Ingolstadt, Germany
Duration: 17 Sep 201518 Sep 2015

Conference

Conference3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015
CountryGermany
CityIngolstadt
Period17/09/201518/09/2015

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