A generalised 𝜆-Core concept for normal form games

Subhadip Chakrabarti; Robert P Gilles; Lina Mallozzi

doi:10.1007/s11590-025-02233-1

A generalised 𝜆-Core concept for normal form games

Queen's Business School (QBS)

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Abstract

We develop a generalisation of the 𝜆-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised 𝜆-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised 𝜆-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.

Original language	English
Journal	Optimization Letters
Early online date	29 Aug 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-025-02233-1
Publication status	Early online date - 29 Aug 2025

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A generalised λ-Core concept for normal form games
Copyright 2025 the authors. This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the author and source are cited.
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Cite this

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abstract = "We develop a generalisation of the 𝜆-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised 𝜆-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised 𝜆-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.",

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AB - We develop a generalisation of the 𝜆-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised 𝜆-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised 𝜆-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.

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A generalised 𝜆-Core concept for normal form games

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