A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size

Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Rajnish Kumar, Sudipta Sarangi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We propose and characterize a new value for TU cooperative games based on egalitarian distribution of worths in smaller coalitions and players’ marginal productivity in larger coalitions. This value belongs to the class of Procedural values due to (Malawski, 2013). Our value is identical with the Shapley value on one extreme and the Equal Division rule on the other extreme. We show that our value is identical with the solidarity value due to (Beal et al., 2017) of the dual game. However, by duality, our characterization intuitively improves over the axiomatization of this solidarity value. We also provide a mechanism that implements our value in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, a generalized version of this value is proposed followed by its characterizations.

Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Early online date07 Jun 2023
Publication statusEarly online date - 07 Jun 2023


  • Shapley value
  • Equal Division rule
  • Solidarity
  • Egalitarian Shapley value.


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