A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems

Chuanchao Lu; Yijun Cui; Ayesha Khalid; Chongyan Gu; Chenghua Wang; Weiqiang Liu

doi:10.1109/SOCC56010.2022.9908076

A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems

Chuanchao Lu, Yijun Cui, Ayesha Khalid, Chongyan Gu, Chenghua Wang, Weiqiang Liu

School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

136 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The lattice-based cryptography problems are known to be secure against the quantum computing attacks, till date no known quantum algorithm is able to solve these hard problems in lattices. Their naive implementations on embedded devices are, however, vulnerable to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks with full key recovery possible via power/EM leakage analysis. This work analyses and attacks the power side channel leakage in the baseline hardware architecture of schoolbook polynomial multiplication, that is an essential component of most of the lattice based cryptography implementations. We first undertake a horizontal correlation power analysis (HCPA) method, optimized to work independent of the precise attack location specification in the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile. Inspite of the inherent difficulties in HCPA, the attack is extremely efficient; with an 99.90% accuracy of recovering any one sub secret-key using only a single trace. Next we undertake the vertical correlation power analysis (VCPA) attack on the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile, that requires larger number of power traces to analyze the correlation. Finally, we propose a novel combined correlation power analysis (CCPA) method that combines the strengths of both the VCPA and the HCPA to further improve the attacking capability of HCPA. We report a complete secret key recovery with a 100% accuracy by using only 4 power traces.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings: 2022 IEEE 35th International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022
Editors	Sakir Sezer, Thomas Buchner, Jurgen Becker, Andrew Marshall, Fahad Siddiqui, Tanja Harbaum, Kieran McLaughlin
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781665459853
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SOCC56010.2022.9908076
Publication status	Published - 10 Oct 2022
Event	35th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022 - Belfast, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom Duration: 05 Sept 2022 → 08 Sept 2022

Publication series

Name	International System on Chip Conference
Volume	2022-September
ISSN (Print)	2164-1676
ISSN (Electronic)	2164-1706

Conference

Conference	35th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Belfast, Northern Ireland
Period	05/09/2022 → 08/09/2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work is supported by grants from National Natural Science Foundation of China (62022041 62134002 62104107), Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20210287), the Royal Society Research Grant IEC/ NSFC/211024 and EPSRC Quantum Communications Hub (EP/T001011/1).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 IEEE.

Keywords

Correlation power analysis
Horizontal CPA (HCPA)
Lattice-based cryptography
Ring-LWE
School-book polynomial multiplier
Side-channel analysis

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Hardware and Architecture
Control and Systems Engineering
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/SOCC56010.2022.9908076Licence: Unspecified

A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems
Copyright 2022 IEEE. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
Accepted author manuscript, 2.81 MBLicence: Unspecified

Cite this

Lu, C., Cui, Y., Khalid, A., Gu, C., Wang, C., & Liu, W. (2022). A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems. In S. Sezer, T. Buchner, J. Becker, A. Marshall, F. Siddiqui, T. Harbaum, & K. McLaughlin (Eds.), Proceedings: 2022 IEEE 35th International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022 (International System on Chip Conference; Vol. 2022-September). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SOCC56010.2022.9908076

Lu, Chuanchao ; Cui, Yijun ; Khalid, Ayesha et al. / A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems. Proceedings: 2022 IEEE 35th International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022. editor / Sakir Sezer ; Thomas Buchner ; Jurgen Becker ; Andrew Marshall ; Fahad Siddiqui ; Tanja Harbaum ; Kieran McLaughlin. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2022. (International System on Chip Conference).

@inproceedings{1b550d9805854342880be36a03302d13,

title = "A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems",

abstract = "The lattice-based cryptography problems are known to be secure against the quantum computing attacks, till date no known quantum algorithm is able to solve these hard problems in lattices. Their naive implementations on embedded devices are, however, vulnerable to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks with full key recovery possible via power/EM leakage analysis. This work analyses and attacks the power side channel leakage in the baseline hardware architecture of schoolbook polynomial multiplication, that is an essential component of most of the lattice based cryptography implementations. We first undertake a horizontal correlation power analysis (HCPA) method, optimized to work independent of the precise attack location specification in the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile. Inspite of the inherent difficulties in HCPA, the attack is extremely efficient; with an 99.90% accuracy of recovering any one sub secret-key using only a single trace. Next we undertake the vertical correlation power analysis (VCPA) attack on the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile, that requires larger number of power traces to analyze the correlation. Finally, we propose a novel combined correlation power analysis (CCPA) method that combines the strengths of both the VCPA and the HCPA to further improve the attacking capability of HCPA. We report a complete secret key recovery with a 100% accuracy by using only 4 power traces.",

keywords = "Correlation power analysis, Horizontal CPA (HCPA), Lattice-based cryptography, Ring-LWE, School-book polynomial multiplier, Side-channel analysis",

author = "Chuanchao Lu and Yijun Cui and Ayesha Khalid and Chongyan Gu and Chenghua Wang and Weiqiang Liu",

note = "Funding Information: This work is supported by grants from National Natural Science Foundation of China (62022041 62134002 62104107), Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20210287), the Royal Society Research Grant IEC/ NSFC/211024 and EPSRC Quantum Communications Hub (EP/T001011/1). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 IEEE.; 35th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022 ; Conference date: 05-09-2022 Through 08-09-2022",

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editor = "Sakir Sezer and Thomas Buchner and Jurgen Becker and Andrew Marshall and Fahad Siddiqui and Tanja Harbaum and Kieran McLaughlin",

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Lu, C, Cui, Y, Khalid, A , Gu, C, Wang, C & Liu, W 2022, A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems. in S Sezer, T Buchner, J Becker, A Marshall, F Siddiqui, T Harbaum & K McLaughlin (eds), Proceedings: 2022 IEEE 35th International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022. International System on Chip Conference, vol. 2022-September, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 35th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022, Belfast, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, 05/09/2022. https://doi.org/10.1109/SOCC56010.2022.9908076

A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems. / Lu, Chuanchao; Cui, Yijun; Khalid, Ayesha et al.
Proceedings: 2022 IEEE 35th International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022. ed. / Sakir Sezer; Thomas Buchner; Jurgen Becker; Andrew Marshall; Fahad Siddiqui; Tanja Harbaum; Kieran McLaughlin. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2022. (International System on Chip Conference; Vol. 2022-September).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AU - Lu, Chuanchao

AU - Cui, Yijun

AU - Khalid, Ayesha

AU - Gu, Chongyan

AU - Wang, Chenghua

AU - Liu, Weiqiang

N1 - Funding Information: This work is supported by grants from National Natural Science Foundation of China (62022041 62134002 62104107), Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20210287), the Royal Society Research Grant IEC/ NSFC/211024 and EPSRC Quantum Communications Hub (EP/T001011/1). Publisher Copyright: © 2022 IEEE.

PY - 2022/10/10

Y1 - 2022/10/10

N2 - The lattice-based cryptography problems are known to be secure against the quantum computing attacks, till date no known quantum algorithm is able to solve these hard problems in lattices. Their naive implementations on embedded devices are, however, vulnerable to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks with full key recovery possible via power/EM leakage analysis. This work analyses and attacks the power side channel leakage in the baseline hardware architecture of schoolbook polynomial multiplication, that is an essential component of most of the lattice based cryptography implementations. We first undertake a horizontal correlation power analysis (HCPA) method, optimized to work independent of the precise attack location specification in the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile. Inspite of the inherent difficulties in HCPA, the attack is extremely efficient; with an 99.90% accuracy of recovering any one sub secret-key using only a single trace. Next we undertake the vertical correlation power analysis (VCPA) attack on the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile, that requires larger number of power traces to analyze the correlation. Finally, we propose a novel combined correlation power analysis (CCPA) method that combines the strengths of both the VCPA and the HCPA to further improve the attacking capability of HCPA. We report a complete secret key recovery with a 100% accuracy by using only 4 power traces.

AB - The lattice-based cryptography problems are known to be secure against the quantum computing attacks, till date no known quantum algorithm is able to solve these hard problems in lattices. Their naive implementations on embedded devices are, however, vulnerable to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks with full key recovery possible via power/EM leakage analysis. This work analyses and attacks the power side channel leakage in the baseline hardware architecture of schoolbook polynomial multiplication, that is an essential component of most of the lattice based cryptography implementations. We first undertake a horizontal correlation power analysis (HCPA) method, optimized to work independent of the precise attack location specification in the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile. Inspite of the inherent difficulties in HCPA, the attack is extremely efficient; with an 99.90% accuracy of recovering any one sub secret-key using only a single trace. Next we undertake the vertical correlation power analysis (VCPA) attack on the schoolbook polynomial multiplier power leakage profile, that requires larger number of power traces to analyze the correlation. Finally, we propose a novel combined correlation power analysis (CCPA) method that combines the strengths of both the VCPA and the HCPA to further improve the attacking capability of HCPA. We report a complete secret key recovery with a 100% accuracy by using only 4 power traces.

KW - Correlation power analysis

KW - Horizontal CPA (HCPA)

KW - Lattice-based cryptography

KW - Ring-LWE

KW - School-book polynomial multiplier

KW - Side-channel analysis

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DO - 10.1109/SOCC56010.2022.9908076

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85140731499

T3 - International System on Chip Conference

BT - Proceedings: 2022 IEEE 35th International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022

A2 - Sezer, Sakir

A2 - Buchner, Thomas

A2 - Becker, Jurgen

A2 - Marshall, Andrew

A2 - Siddiqui, Fahad

A2 - Harbaum, Tanja

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PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 35th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022

Y2 - 5 September 2022 through 8 September 2022

ER -

Lu C, Cui Y, Khalid A , Gu C, Wang C, Liu W. A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems. In Sezer S, Buchner T, Becker J, Marshall A, Siddiqui F, Harbaum T, McLaughlin K, editors, Proceedings: 2022 IEEE 35th International System-on-Chip Conference, SOCC 2022. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2022. (International System on Chip Conference). doi: 10.1109/SOCC56010.2022.9908076

A novel combined correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on schoolbook polynomial multiplication in lattice-based cryptosystems

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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