A simple game-theoretic analysis of peering and transit contracting among Internet service providers

Narine Badasyan, Subhadip Chakrabarti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of two Internet service providers (ISPs), drawn from a larger set consisting of Tiers-1 and -2 ISPs, who choose between peering and transit agreements. The study focuses on the costs of interconnection taking into account traffic imbalances. The analysis suggests that if the traffic flows and the costs of interconnection are fairly shared, the provider's peer, otherwise they choose transit. Moreover, the joint profits are maximized under the transit arrangement. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4-18
Number of pages15
JournalTelecommunications Policy
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Information Systems
  • Development
  • Law
  • Library and Information Sciences
  • Sociology and Political Science

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