A solution concept for network games: The role of multilateral interactions

Surajit Borkotokey, Rajnish Kumar, Sudipta Sarangi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of both players and their links and characterize it for a fixed network. Our characterization is along the lines of the characterization of the Position value for Network games by van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012). The allocation rule so defined admits multilateral interactions among the players through their links which distinguishes it from the other existing rules. Next, we extend our allocation rule to flexible networks à la Jackson (2005).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)912-920
Number of pages9
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume243
Issue number3
Early online date26 Dec 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Jun 2015

Keywords

  • Network games
  • Allocation rules
  • Cooperative games

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