Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

Dimtrios Diamantaras, Robert P. Gilles

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)210-222
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume80
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Economics and Econometrics

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