Assertion, Belief, and Context

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3 Citations (Scopus)
359 Downloads (Pure)


This paper argues for a treatment of belief as essentially sensitive to certain features of context. The first part gives an argument that we must take belief to be context-sensitive in the same way that assertion is, if we are to preserve appealing principles tying belief to sincere assertion. In particular, whether an agent counts as believing that p in a context depends on the space of alternative possibilities the agent is considering in that context. One and the same doxastic state may amount to belief that p in one context but not another. The second part of the paper gives a formal treatment of doxastic states, according to which belief is context-sensitive along just these lines. The model is applied to characterize (but not to refute) skeptical arguments.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4951-4977
Number of pages27
Issue number11
Early online date18 May 2017
Publication statusPublished - 19 Nov 2018


  • assertion
  • belief
  • contextualism
  • sincerity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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