Autonomy and regulation of state agencies: Reinforcement, indifference or compensation?

P.G. Roness, K. Verhoest, K. Rubecksen, M. MacCarthaigh

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    23 Citations (Scopus)


    This paper analyses the relationships between the autonomy and regulation of state agencies in Norway, Ireland and Flanders (Belgium). The empirical basis is provided by broad surveys of public sector organizations carried out in 2002-2004. Three hypotheses on these relationships are formulated and examined, indicating different patterns. The reinforcement hypothesis, stating a negative relationship does not get any support. On the other hand, the compensation hypothesis, stating a positive relationship gets some support. In general, however, the indifference hypothesis, stating low or no correlations seems to be the most adequate. The hypotheses are also linked to prevalent administrative doctrines, and the empirical findings indicate how relevant they are.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)155-174
    Number of pages20
    JournalPublic Organization Review
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - 01 Jun 2008

    Bibliographical note

    Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)


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