Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

Arnold Polanski

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006

Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

Arnold Polanski

Queen's Business School (QBS)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150). All pairs, that reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	557-565
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	134(1)
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006
Publication status	Published - May 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006

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Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

Abstract

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