Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

Emiliya Lazarova, P. Borm, B. Van Velzen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)507-520
Number of pages14
JournalTOP
Volumeforthcoming
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2010

Bibliographical note

Teaching or Research: 15147

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
  • Statistics and Probability

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