Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games

Indrajit Ray, Sonali Sen Gupta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. any small perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)541–562
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume42
Early online date06 Dec 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2013
Externally publishedYes

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