TY - JOUR
T1 - Competing axes of power in the global plastics treaty: Understanding the politics of progress and setbacks in negotiating a high-ambition agreement
AU - Dauvergne, Peter
AU - Allan, Jen Iris
AU - Beaudoin, Simon
AU - Almroth, Bethanie Carney
AU - Clapp, Jennifer
AU - Cowan, Emily
AU - de Groot, Babet
AU - Farrelly, Trisia
AU - Grilli, Natalia
AU - Mah, Alice
AU - Mendenhall, Elizabeth
AU - Paik, Rosetta
AU - Ralston, Rob
AU - Stoett, Peter
AU - Stöfen-O’Brien, Aleke
AU - Tiller, Rachel
AU - Villarrubia-Gómez, Patricia
AU - Taggart, Jack
AU - Vince, Joanna
PY - 2025/11
Y1 - 2025/11
N2 - Headlines in December 2024 proclaimed the “collapse” and “failure” of United Nations plastics treaty negotiations in Busan, South Korea. This is, however, an overly simplistic and pessimistic portrayal. Progress on less contentious issues was made, and the meeting was adjourned with a commitment to continue negotiating in 2025 on the basis of the “Chair’s text.” Significantly, at the closing plenary, a majority of states voiced support for a “high-ambition” treaty covering the full life cycle of plastics, drawing clear red lines on the necessity of legally binding measures to phase out hazardous plastics, regulate chemicals in plastics, and finance just transitions. Delegates from developing countries such as Rwanda, Panama, and Mexico were especially steadfast in demanding an “ambitious” treaty to end plastic pollution, including in marine ecosystems. Yet there were also setbacks, as multiple, intersecting axes of pro-plastics power – comprising loose alliances of petrostates and business interests profiting from rising plastics production – sought to thwart high-ambition obligations. Industry actors lobbied against stringent commitments and endeavored to narrow the treaty’s scope to downstream waste management. Petrostates such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stalled discussions and bracketed high-ambition text. Divisions between developing and developed countries also emerged over the appropriate financing mechanism. Despite this turbulence, achieving a strong treaty remains possible. But this will require strengthening the high-ambition axis of power, enhancing transparency and accountability, and ensuring the meaningful inclusion of rights holders, local communities, and civil society.
AB - Headlines in December 2024 proclaimed the “collapse” and “failure” of United Nations plastics treaty negotiations in Busan, South Korea. This is, however, an overly simplistic and pessimistic portrayal. Progress on less contentious issues was made, and the meeting was adjourned with a commitment to continue negotiating in 2025 on the basis of the “Chair’s text.” Significantly, at the closing plenary, a majority of states voiced support for a “high-ambition” treaty covering the full life cycle of plastics, drawing clear red lines on the necessity of legally binding measures to phase out hazardous plastics, regulate chemicals in plastics, and finance just transitions. Delegates from developing countries such as Rwanda, Panama, and Mexico were especially steadfast in demanding an “ambitious” treaty to end plastic pollution, including in marine ecosystems. Yet there were also setbacks, as multiple, intersecting axes of pro-plastics power – comprising loose alliances of petrostates and business interests profiting from rising plastics production – sought to thwart high-ambition obligations. Industry actors lobbied against stringent commitments and endeavored to narrow the treaty’s scope to downstream waste management. Petrostates such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stalled discussions and bracketed high-ambition text. Divisions between developing and developed countries also emerged over the appropriate financing mechanism. Despite this turbulence, achieving a strong treaty remains possible. But this will require strengthening the high-ambition axis of power, enhancing transparency and accountability, and ensuring the meaningful inclusion of rights holders, local communities, and civil society.
U2 - 10.1016/j.marpol.2025.106820
DO - 10.1016/j.marpol.2025.106820
M3 - Article
SN - 0308-597X
VL - 181
JO - Marine Policy
JF - Marine Policy
M1 - 106820
ER -