TY - GEN
T1 - Competition and cooperation analysis for data sponsored market: a network effects model
AU - Xiong, Zehui
AU - Feng, Shaohan
AU - Niyato, Dusit
AU - Wang, Ping
AU - Zhang, Yang
PY - 2018/6/8
Y1 - 2018/6/8
N2 - The data sponsored scheme allows the content provider to cover parts of the cellular data costs for mobile users. Thus the content service becomes appealing to more users and potentially generates more profit gain to the content provider. In this paper, we consider a sponsored data market with a monopoly network service provider, a single content provider, and multiple users. In particular, we model the interactions of three entities as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the service provider and content provider act as the leaders determining the pricing and sponsoring strategies, respectively, in the first stage, and the users act as the followers deciding on their data demand in the second stage. We investigate the mutual interaction of the service provider and content provider in two cases: (i) competitive case, where the content provider and service provider optimize their strategies separately and competitively, each aiming at maximizing the profit and revenue, respectively; and (ii) cooperative case, where the two providers jointly optimize their strategies, with the purpose of maximizing their aggregate profits. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in both cases. Via extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the network effects significantly improve the payoff of three entities in this market, i.e., utilities of users, the profit of content provider and the revenue of service provider. In addition, it is revealed that the cooperation between the two providers is the best choice for all three entities.
AB - The data sponsored scheme allows the content provider to cover parts of the cellular data costs for mobile users. Thus the content service becomes appealing to more users and potentially generates more profit gain to the content provider. In this paper, we consider a sponsored data market with a monopoly network service provider, a single content provider, and multiple users. In particular, we model the interactions of three entities as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the service provider and content provider act as the leaders determining the pricing and sponsoring strategies, respectively, in the first stage, and the users act as the followers deciding on their data demand in the second stage. We investigate the mutual interaction of the service provider and content provider in two cases: (i) competitive case, where the content provider and service provider optimize their strategies separately and competitively, each aiming at maximizing the profit and revenue, respectively; and (ii) cooperative case, where the two providers jointly optimize their strategies, with the purpose of maximizing their aggregate profits. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in both cases. Via extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the network effects significantly improve the payoff of three entities in this market, i.e., utilities of users, the profit of content provider and the revenue of service provider. In addition, it is revealed that the cooperation between the two providers is the best choice for all three entities.
KW - Competition and cooperation
KW - Data sponsoring
KW - Network effects
KW - Socially-aware service
U2 - 10.1109/WCNC.2018.8376985
DO - 10.1109/WCNC.2018.8376985
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85049231189
SN - 9781538617359
T3 - IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC: Proceedings
BT - 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018: Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018
Y2 - 15 April 2018 through 18 April 2018
ER -