TY - JOUR
T1 - Complementing and correcting representative institutions: When and how to use mini-publics.
AU - Kuyper, Jonathan
AU - Wolkenstein, Fabio
PY - 2019/5/30
Y1 - 2019/5/30
N2 - In democratic theory and practice, it has become a popular view that designed deliberative mini‐publics can effectively counteract failures of representative democratic institutions. But when should mini‐publics be deployed, and how should they be designed? This article develops a framework for thinking about these questions. It argues that when representative democratic institutions ensure the empowerment of inclusions, enable the formation of collective agendas and wills, and are capable of translating those agendas into binding decisions, mini‐publics should be used sparingly and as complementary initiatives; the less representative institutions are able to serve these functions, the more mini‐publics should gain independence and standing to correct these problems. The article shows how this can be operationalised in light of two key institutional design issues – coupling and authority – and discusses some empirical examples that foreground the empirical leverage offered by the suggested framework
AB - In democratic theory and practice, it has become a popular view that designed deliberative mini‐publics can effectively counteract failures of representative democratic institutions. But when should mini‐publics be deployed, and how should they be designed? This article develops a framework for thinking about these questions. It argues that when representative democratic institutions ensure the empowerment of inclusions, enable the formation of collective agendas and wills, and are capable of translating those agendas into binding decisions, mini‐publics should be used sparingly and as complementary initiatives; the less representative institutions are able to serve these functions, the more mini‐publics should gain independence and standing to correct these problems. The article shows how this can be operationalised in light of two key institutional design issues – coupling and authority – and discusses some empirical examples that foreground the empirical leverage offered by the suggested framework
U2 - 10.1111/1475-6765.12306
DO - 10.1111/1475-6765.12306
M3 - Article
VL - 58
SP - 656
EP - 675
JO - European Journal of Political Research
JF - European Journal of Political Research
SN - 0304-4130
ER -