Constituency Preferences and Committee Selection in the Mexican Cámara de Diputados

Christopher D. Raymond, Sergio Bárcena Juárez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
60 Downloads (Pure)


Previous research examining selection to legislative committees has assumed that the impact of constituency preferences on committee assignments is due to the incentives for individual legislators to use their committee seats to increase their personal chances of re-election. Examining the case of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (where legislators were, until recently, barred from re-election), this study argues that the impact of constituency preferences on selection to committees also occurs because parties have incentives for their members to use committee assignments to increase the party's chances of being re-elected. Analysis of assignments to 11 committees over 4 legislative terms provides support for the argument. These findings reinforce previous research arguing that concerns with constituency representation and its impact on re-election also apply to political parties and not solely to individual legislators.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-117
Number of pages23
JournalLatin American Politics and Society
Issue number4
Early online date28 Aug 2019
Publication statusPublished - 01 Nov 2019


  • cartel theory
  • committee assignments
  • Constituency preferences
  • distributive theory
  • legislative organization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations


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