Abstract
Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The
standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a
detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view
using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not
necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but
whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to
increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In
contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more
likely to increase shareholder value.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-40 |
Journal | The Journal of Economic History |
Volume | 76 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 25 Feb 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2016 |