Crisis Cartels: Non-Economic Values, the Public Interest and Institutional Considerations

Bruce Wardhaugh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper considers the use of non-economic considerations in Article 101(3) analysis of industrial restructuring agreements, using the Commission's Decisions in Synthetic Fibres, Stichting Baksteen, and the recent UK Dairy Initiative as examples. I argue that contra to the Commission's recent economics-based approach; there is room for non-economic considerations to be taken into account within the framework of the European Treaties. The competition law issue is whether the provisions of Article 101(3) can save such agreements.
I further argue that there is legal room for non-economic considerations to be considered in evaluating these restructuring agreements, it is not clear who the appropriate arbiter of these considerations should be given the institutional limitations of courts (which have no democratic mandate), specialised competition agencies (which may be too technocratic in focus) and legislatures (which are susceptible to capture by rent-seeking interest groups).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)311 - 340
JournalEuropean Competition Journal
Volume10
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2014

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