Abstract
As different crowdsourcing routines (metaphorically labeled as “fishing”
and “hunting” in this study) are available to address highly technical problems, solutionseeking organizations need to mindfully design, select, and deploy crowdsourcing routines that
account for the behavior and motivation of experts. Drawing on a survey involving 260 experts
in science, technology, engineering, and math fields, we found that, elite experts (individuals
with seniority, aged over 40, and a proven track record in the field with numerous publications
and patents) are generally less inclined to search for crowdsourcing open calls and prefer to be
contacted by solution seekers. In contrast, non-elite experts (early career experts, aged under
40, and with fewer patents and publications) actively search to find open calls. Regarding their
motivational underpinnings, our findings suggest that elite experts are motivated more by nonfinancial incentives than non-elite experts. Further, as the frequency with which they are
contacted increases, non-elite experts tend to prefer more non-financial over financial
incentives. These results indicate that the fishing crowdsourcing routine generally elicits
solutions from unproven, non-elite experts that demand more financial rewards. However, the
hunting routine taps a pool of elite experts with proven capabilities who are less financially
oriented and, thus, may provide better, yet less expensive solutions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1393-1409 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Industrial and Corporate Change |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 6 |
Early online date | 27 Oct 2023 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 22 Nov 2023 |
Keywords
- Economics and Econometrics
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Management of Technology and Innovation