Culpability and liability in the law of homicide: do lay moral intuitions accord with legal distinctions?

Adopting an approach that is mindful of the complex relationship between language and concepts, we explore whether lay conceptual intuitions and corresponding judgments are congruent with legal views in the context of Anglo-American traditions. Specifically, we examine the concepts of culpability and liability (as well as the related concept of intentional action) and cases of homicide. After providing a rational reconstruction of these concepts in criminal law (as they are embedded in the structure of offences and defences) and of the relevant categories of criminal homicide (i.e., the different types of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter), we report three sets of studies on whether ordinary people’s moral intuitions accord with legal distinctions. One set of studies probed whether people’s judgements of culpability and liability are sensitive to the legal offence elements of purpose, knowledge, and risk (in terms of recklessness). A second set of studies probed whether their judgements take into account the legal distinction between recklessness and negligence. The third set of studies probed whether their judgements are responsive to legal justifications and excuses related to situations of lack of control over one’s mental states and actions. Our results suggest that people’s judgments of culpability and liability not only adhere to the notion of just deserts that generally constrains Anglo-American legal traditions but also incorporate the specific criteria associated with culpability and liability in the law