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Abstract
I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft even though individual bribe size might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Anti-corruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation if they lower demanded bribe levels and thus encourage small businesses to participate.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 108-125 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
| Volume | 117 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 01 Sept 2014 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2015 |
Keywords
- corruption
- decentralization
Access to Document
- Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation
Copyright 2014 The author This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12081/abstract. Authors are not required to remove preprints posted prior to acceptance of the submitted version.
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- 2 Participation in conference
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28th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association
Popov, S. V. (Participant)
27 Aug 2013Activity: Participating in or organising an event types › Participation in conference
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Missouri Economics Conference
Popov, S. V. (Participant)
22 Mar 2013Activity: Participating in or organising an event types › Participation in conference