Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

Sergey V. Popov

doi:10.1111/sjoe.12081

Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

Sergey V. Popov

Queen's Business School (QBS)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

349 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft even though individual bribe size might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Anti-corruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation if they lower demanded bribe levels and thus encourage small businesses to participate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	108-125
Number of pages	18
Journal	Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume	117
Issue number	1
Early online date	01 Sept 2014
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12081
Publication status	Published - Jan 2015

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

corruption
decentralization

Access to Document

10.1111/sjoe.12081

Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation
Copyright 2014 The author This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12081/abstract. Authors are not required to remove preprints posted prior to acceptance of the submitted version.
Submitted manuscript, 332 KB

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12081/abstract

28th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association
Popov, S. V. (Participant)
27 Aug 2013
Activity: Participating in or organising an event types › Participation in conference
Missouri Economics Conference
Popov, S. V. (Participant)
22 Mar 2013
Activity: Participating in or organising an event types › Participation in conference

Cite this

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Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

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Activities

28th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association

Missouri Economics Conference

Cite this