Deliberative Equality and the Transgovernmental Politics of the Global Financial Architecture

Andrew Baker

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    37 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Revisiting the concept of transgovernmentalism, originally developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, can shed considerable light on the nature of interstate cooperation in contemporary global financial governance. Transgovernmentalism highlights how certain technocratic policy communities, composed of finance ministries, central banks, and regulators, dominate the global financial architecture. It also provides insights into the political and social basis of these actors' interactions and deliberations. Most importantly, renovating the concept of transgovernmentalism brings the participatory deficits in the current global financial architecture into sharp focus and points us in the direction of a workable reform agenda that would expand inclusion and participation. This article advocates basing future reform on efforts to achieve a closer realization of the principle of “deliberative equality.” Unfortunately, “transgovernmentalism” is incompatible with deliberative equality, meaning that it is precisely the transgovernmental characteristics of the current global financial architecture that have to be challenged and overturned if we are to arrive at anything approximating deliberative equality.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)195-218
    Number of pages24
    JournalGlobal Governance
    Volume15
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2009

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Environmental Science(all)
    • Safety Research
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Deliberative Equality and the Transgovernmental Politics of the Global Financial Architecture'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this