Disgust, offensiveness and the law

David Archard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Martha Nussbaum’s concern is to limit the role that emotions can legitimately play in the definition of the criminal law. She would allow nuisance laws to curtail the occasioning of disgust but only disgust of a certain kind. Problems arise for her account when she extends this analysis to the prevention of offensiveness. Unavoidable is an evaluation of those beliefs subscription to which explains the taking of offence. Hence the principal problem for a liberalism of the kind Nussbaum defends is how to combine Mill’s harm principle with a Rawlsian understanding of the reasonableness of belief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)314-321
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Applied Philosophy
Volume25
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 01 Nov 2008
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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