Do judges prefer advisors with dependent or independent errors? Investigating judges’ advice selection and advice weighting

Advice stemming from sources with errors that are dependent on each other is usually less accurate than advice provided by sources with independent errors, while simultaneously exhibiting greater consensus. We investigate whether or not individuals express a preference for advice with dependent errors by choosing it over advice with independent errors and by weighting it more strongly. We test for this preference both in a situation where error interdependence does not negatively affect advice accuracy as well as in a situation where advice with dependent errors is less accurate than advice with independent errors. In a series of six studies, we show that, when being given the opportunity to choose between the two types of advice, participants only prefer advice with dependent errors if this is not detrimental for accuracy. However, when being sequentially provided with both types of advice, they generally weight advice with dependent errors more than advice with independent errors, even if the latter is more accurate. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that advice with dependent errors exhibits greater consensus, leading participants' initial estimates to lie outside the range of the advisors' judgments more frequently.