Efficient public good provision between and within groups

Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar; Jorge  Bruno; Renaud Foucart; Sonali SenGupta

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006

Efficient public good provision between and within groups

Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart, Sonali SenGupta^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	183-190
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	150
Early online date	13 Dec 2024
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006
Publication status	Early online date - 13 Dec 2024

Keywords

public good provision
Gallice and Monzon
public goods game

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10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006Licence: CC BY

Efficient public good provision between and within groups
Copyright 2024 the authors. This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the author and source are cited.
Final published version, 710 KBLicence: CC BY

1 Discussion paper

Efficient public good provision in a multipolar world
SenGupta, S., Foucart, R., Anwar, S. & Bruno, J., Jul 2023.
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AU - Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib

AU - Bruno, Jorge

AU - Foucart, Renaud

AU - SenGupta, Sonali

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Y1 - 2024/12/13

N2 - We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

AB - We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

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KW - public goods game

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006

M3 - Article

SN - 1090-2473

VL - 150

SP - 183

EP - 190

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Efficient public good provision between and within groups

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Keywords

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Efficient public good provision in a multipolar world

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