Equilibrium design in a n-player quadratic game

Trivikram Dokka, Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray, Sonali SenGupta*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCEs), using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.
Original languageEnglish
JournalReview of Economic Design
Early online date04 Apr 2022
DOIs
Publication statusEarly online date - 04 Apr 2022

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Equilibrium design in a n-player quadratic game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this