Fair cake-cutting in practice

Maria  Kyropoulou; Josue Ortega; Erel  Segal-Halevi

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.027

Fair cake-cutting in practice

Maria Kyropoulou, Josue Ortega^*, Erel Segal-Halevi

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

Using two lab experiments, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. Although the observed subjects' strategic behavior eliminates the fairness guarantees of envy-free procedures, we nonetheless find evidence that suggests that envy-free procedures are fairer than their proportional counterparts.

Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms.
We also find that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning increases strategic behavior, but also reduces envy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	28-49
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	133
Early online date	17 Feb 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.027
Publication status	Published - 01 May 2022

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Fair cake-cutting in practice
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abstract = "Using two lab experiments, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. Although the observed subjects' strategic behavior eliminates the fairness guarantees of envy-free procedures, we nonetheless find evidence that suggests that envy-free procedures are fairer than their proportional counterparts. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms.We also find that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning increases strategic behavior, but also reduces envy.",

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AB - Using two lab experiments, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. Although the observed subjects' strategic behavior eliminates the fairness guarantees of envy-free procedures, we nonetheless find evidence that suggests that envy-free procedures are fairer than their proportional counterparts. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms.We also find that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning increases strategic behavior, but also reduces envy.

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Fair cake-cutting in practice

Abstract

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