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Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences

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Abstract

We study the cake-cutting problem where agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang and Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang–Wu and achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.
Original languageEnglish
Article number109064
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume190
Early online date11 Mar 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2020

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