Abstract
We study the cake-cutting problem where agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang and Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang–Wu and achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 109064 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 190 |
| Early online date | 11 Mar 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - May 2020 |
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