Game theoretic foundations of the gately power measure for directed networks

Rob Gilles, Lina Mallozzi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players—constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU-games. We investigate the properties of these TU-representations and investigate the Gately value of the TU-representation resulting in the Gately power measure. We establish when the Gately measure is a core power gauge, investigate the relationship of the Gately with the 𝛽-measure, and construct an axiomatisation of the Gately measure.

Original languageEnglish
Article number64
Number of pages19
JournalGames
Volume14
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 26 Sept 2023

Keywords

  • A14
  • C71
  • D20
  • Gately measure
  • authority network
  • axiomatisation
  • cooperative game
  • network centrality measure

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