Group Contributions in TU-games : A class of k-lateral Shapley values

Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Loyimee Gogoi, Rajnish Kumar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
43 Downloads (Pure)


In this paper we introduce the notion of group contributions in TU-games and propose a new class of values which we call the class of k-lateral Shapley values. Most of the values for TU-games implicitly assume that players are independent in deciding to leave or join a coalition. However, in many real life situations players are bound by the decisions taken by their peers. This leads to the idea of group contributions where we consider the marginality of groups upto a certain size. We show that group contributions can play an important role in determining players’ shares in the total resource they generate. The proposed value has the flavor of egalitarianism within group contributions. We provide two characterizations of our values.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Early online date27 Mar 2020
Publication statusEarly online date - 27 Mar 2020


  • Game theory
  • Group contributions
  • The k-lateral Shapley values
  • The Shapley value
  • TU cooperative game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Information Systems and Management


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