Abstract
A prominent criticism of compatibilist theories of moral responsibility is that they do not deal adequately with cases of manipulation, and particularly with induced desires. So, for example, accounts that give the conditions for responsibility in terms of the reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism governing one's decisions, as Fischer and Ravizza (1998) do, seem to leave the door open to cases such as the following.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 139-149 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | American Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2012 |
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Cite this
Clarke, R. (2012). How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(2), 139-149.