Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    16 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein’s recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.
    LanguageEnglish
    Pages19-34
    Number of pages16
    JournalJournal of Applied Philosophy
    Volume25
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 2008

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    Autonomy
    Informed Consent
    Self-ownership
    Violations
    Sovereignty
    Harm
    Personal Autonomy
    Merit
    Joel Feinberg

    Cite this

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    abstract = "Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein’s recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.",
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    Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership. / Archard, Dave.

    In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 1, 02.2008, p. 19-34.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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