Investigating the robustness of lobbying laws: Evidence from the Austrian case

The robustness of a lobbying law is defined as the capacity of the regulation to increase transparency and accountability. Differences in the robustness of lobbying laws are common among regulated political systems. The aim of this work is to explain this variation. The analysis develops a set of hypotheses based on political agenda-setting effects, systems of interest representation and partisanship, aimed at explaining the robustness of lobbying laws. The arguments are tested performing a within-case analysis of the Austrian lobbying regulation passed in 2012. The results of the case study suggest that the differences in the robustness can be explained by the presence of salient lobbying scandals, which encourage the government to formulate stricter rules for consultancies and corporate lobbyists. Conversely, the corporatist tradition explains the introduction of less strict rules for other interest groups, in particular for social partners.