Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

Subhadip Chakrabarti, Supanit Tangsangasaksri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)55-64
Number of pages10
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume62
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Psychology(all)
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Sociology and Political Science

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