Linear Cost Sharing in Economies with Non-Samuelsonian Public Goods: Core Equivalence: Core equivalence

Robert P. Gilles*, Dimitrios Diamantaras

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an economy with non-Samuelsonian public goods and we focus on linear cost sharing. In a linear cost sharing equilibrium all agents in the economy optimize given a certain fixed cost share to be contributed towards the provision of public goods in the economy. Hence, each agent pays a certain fraction of the total establishment costs of public goods and these cost shares are common knowledge. We show that for a certain fixed contribution scheme the resulting linear cost share equilibria are equivalent to corresponding core allocations, in which the core is based on the integral of the individual cost shares. We also show that there is no equivalence of the Foley core with cost share equilibria, even in well-behaved large economies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)121-139
Number of pages19
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume15
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1998
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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