Measuring and explaining de facto regional policy autonomy variation in a constitutionally symmetrical federation: the case of Ethiopia, 1995–2020

This article measures regional policy autonomy and explains the factors that drive autonomy variation in land policy from 1995 to 2020, taking Ethiopia, the late twentieth-century adoption of federalism and a federation of very diverse regions, as a case. By comparing three regions, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the article shows that de facto regional policy autonomy varies, although the regions are constitutionally symmetrical. Why do some regions have less de facto autonomy than others? Contrary to conventional expectations, party noncongruence appears less important in explaining the regional autonomy variation. Regional capacity, national integration goals and development objectives appear to have played a major role in generating de facto regional policy autonomy variation without a constitutional amendment. Regions lacking capacity and peripheral regions tend to face more centralization than others. Insights from Ethiopia imply that states embracing federalism should consider regional inequality in development and capacity in designing a federal constitution.