Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences

Josue Ortega

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003

Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences

Josue Ortega

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

10 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	15-24
Number of pages	10
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	103
Early online date	14 Nov 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003
Publication status	Published - Jan 2020

Access to Document

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003Licence: Unspecified

Multi-unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences
©2019 Elsevier B. V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/,which permits distribution and reproduction for non-commercial purposes, provided the author and source are cited.
Accepted author manuscript, 429 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Josue Ortega
- J.Ortega@qub.ac.uk
- Queen's Management School - Lecturer
- Economics
Person: Academic

Cite this

@article{7370484a7a894d3ca6dc105ece055a00,

title = "Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences",

abstract = "I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.",

author = "Josue Ortega",

year = "2020",

month = jan,

doi = "10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003",

language = "English",

volume = "103",

pages = "15--24",

journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",

issn = "0165-4896",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences

AU - Ortega, Josue

PY - 2020/1

Y1 - 2020/1

N2 - I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.

AB - I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003

M3 - Article

VL - 103

SP - 15

EP - 24

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

ER -