Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-24
Number of pages10
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume103
Early online date14 Nov 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

Fingerprint

Assignment
Unit
Competitive Equilibrium
Axiom
Fairness
fairness
Disjoint
money
income
Object
Group
Strategy
Money
Meaning
Context
Competitive equilibrium
Strategy-proof
Income
Egalitarian solution

Cite this

@article{7370484a7a894d3ca6dc105ece055a00,
title = "Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences",
abstract = "I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.",
author = "Josue Ortega",
year = "2020",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003",
language = "English",
volume = "103",
pages = "15--24",
journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",
issn = "0165-4896",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences. / Ortega, Josue.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 103, 01.2020, p. 15-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences

AU - Ortega, Josue

PY - 2020/1

Y1 - 2020/1

N2 - I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.

AB - I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003

M3 - Article

VL - 103

SP - 15

EP - 24

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

ER -