Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 15-24 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| Volume | 103 |
| Early online date | 14 Nov 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2020 |
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Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences. / Ortega, Josue.
In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 103, 01.2020, p. 15-24.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences
AU - Ortega, Josue
PY - 2020/1
Y1 - 2020/1
N2 - I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.
AB - I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.
U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003
M3 - Article
VL - 103
SP - 15
EP - 24
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
SN - 0165-4896
ER -