Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-24
Number of pages10
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume103
Early online date14 Nov 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

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