Abstract
We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.
Highlights
► We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. ► These “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. ► We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. ► We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts like strong link deletion proofness.
Highlights
► We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. ► These “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. ► We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. ► We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts like strong link deletion proofness.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 159-165 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 26 Mar 2012 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2012 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
- General Social Sciences
- General Psychology
- Sociology and Political Science