Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

Robert P. Gilles; Subhadip Chakrabarti; Sudipta Sarangi

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.005

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

Queen's University Belfast

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

Highlights
► We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. ► These “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. ► We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. ► We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts like strong link deletion proofness.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	159-165
Number of pages	7
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	64
Issue number	2
Early online date	26 Mar 2012
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.005
Publication status	Published - Sept 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Sociology and Political Science

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title = "Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent",

abstract = "We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness. Highlights ► We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. ► These “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. ► We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. ► We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts like strong link deletion proofness.",

author = "Gilles, \{Robert P.\} and Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi",

year = "2012",

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journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",

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T1 - Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

AU - Gilles, Robert P.

AU - Chakrabarti, Subhadip

AU - Sarangi, Sudipta

PY - 2012/9

Y1 - 2012/9

N2 - We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness. Highlights ► We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. ► These “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. ► We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. ► We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts like strong link deletion proofness.

AB - We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness. Highlights ► We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. ► These “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. ► We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. ► We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts like strong link deletion proofness.

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.005

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.005

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SN - 0165-4896

VL - 64

SP - 159

EP - 165

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

IS - 2

ER -

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

Abstract

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