Abstract
This article theorizes when and why governments negotiate peace with pro-government militias (PGMs) or “pro-state” paramilitary groups. I argue that governments are more likely to negotiate with PGMs when PGMs conduct mass human rights violations and when the government faces domestic and international pressure to account for PGM violence. While governments support (even if tacitly) PGMs for short-term advantages in counterinsurgency, PGMs often pursue their own agendas and can end up harming state interests resulting in a shift from support to curtailing PGM activity. I build this argument drawing on examples from around the world and providing initial evidence from the Colombian government’s negotiated agreements with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in Santa Fe de Ralito in 2003-2005.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1–29 |
| Journal | Negotiation Journal |
| Volume | 42 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 11 Mar 2026 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
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