Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

Robert P. Gilles, Sudipta Sarangi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)


We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-185
Number of pages5
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2010

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Psychology(all)
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Sociology and Political Science


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