We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.
|Number of pages||5|
|Journal||Mathematical Social Sciences|
|Publication status||Published - Nov 2010|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
- Social Sciences(all)
- Sociology and Political Science