Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments

Arnab Kumar Biswas; S. K. Nandy; Ranjani Narayan

doi:10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936

Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments

Arnab Kumar Biswas, S. K. Nandy, Ranjani Narayan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

NoC based high performance MP-SoCs can have multiple secure regions or Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). These TEEs can be separated by non-secure regions or Rich Execution Environments (REEs) in the same MP-SoC. All communications between two TEEs need to cross the in-between REEs. Without any security mechanisms, these traffic flows can face router attacks in REEs. Both routing table and routing logic based routers are vulnerable to such attacks. In this paper, we address attacks on routing tables. We propose two countermeasures-Run-time protector and Restart-time protector. In addition to detection and prevention, proposed protectors can locate a malicious router also. Synthesis results show that, the area of a Run-time protector and a Restart-time protector is only 6.6% and 2% of a conventional router area respectively.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT 2015): Proceedings
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781479999859
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936
Publication status	Published - 14 Jan 2016
Externally published	Yes
Event	IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015 - Bangalore, India Duration: 10 Jul 2015 → 11 Jul 2015

Publication series

Name	2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015

Conference

Conference	IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015
Country/Territory	India
City	Bangalore
Period	10/07/2015 → 11/07/2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 IEEE.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Hardware and Architecture
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Computer Networks and Communications
Software

Access to Document

10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

Biswas, A. K., Nandy, S. K., & Narayan, R. (2016). Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT 2015): Proceedings Article 7383936 (2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936

Biswas, Arnab Kumar ; Nandy, S. K. ; Narayan, Ranjani. / Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments. 2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT 2015): Proceedings . Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. (2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015).

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title = "Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments",

abstract = "NoC based high performance MP-SoCs can have multiple secure regions or Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). These TEEs can be separated by non-secure regions or Rich Execution Environments (REEs) in the same MP-SoC. All communications between two TEEs need to cross the in-between REEs. Without any security mechanisms, these traffic flows can face router attacks in REEs. Both routing table and routing logic based routers are vulnerable to such attacks. In this paper, we address attacks on routing tables. We propose two countermeasures-Run-time protector and Restart-time protector. In addition to detection and prevention, proposed protectors can locate a malicious router also. Synthesis results show that, the area of a Run-time protector and a Restart-time protector is only 6.6% and 2% of a conventional router area respectively.",

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Biswas, AK, Nandy, SK & Narayan, R 2016, Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments. in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT 2015): Proceedings ., 7383936, 2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015, Bangalore, India, 10/07/2015. https://doi.org/10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936

Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments. / Biswas, Arnab Kumar; Nandy, S. K.; Narayan, Ranjani.
2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT 2015): Proceedings . Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. 7383936 (2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments

AU - Biswas, Arnab Kumar

AU - Nandy, S. K.

AU - Narayan, Ranjani

PY - 2016/1/14

Y1 - 2016/1/14

N2 - NoC based high performance MP-SoCs can have multiple secure regions or Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). These TEEs can be separated by non-secure regions or Rich Execution Environments (REEs) in the same MP-SoC. All communications between two TEEs need to cross the in-between REEs. Without any security mechanisms, these traffic flows can face router attacks in REEs. Both routing table and routing logic based routers are vulnerable to such attacks. In this paper, we address attacks on routing tables. We propose two countermeasures-Run-time protector and Restart-time protector. In addition to detection and prevention, proposed protectors can locate a malicious router also. Synthesis results show that, the area of a Run-time protector and a Restart-time protector is only 6.6% and 2% of a conventional router area respectively.

AB - NoC based high performance MP-SoCs can have multiple secure regions or Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). These TEEs can be separated by non-secure regions or Rich Execution Environments (REEs) in the same MP-SoC. All communications between two TEEs need to cross the in-between REEs. Without any security mechanisms, these traffic flows can face router attacks in REEs. Both routing table and routing logic based routers are vulnerable to such attacks. In this paper, we address attacks on routing tables. We propose two countermeasures-Run-time protector and Restart-time protector. In addition to detection and prevention, proposed protectors can locate a malicious router also. Synthesis results show that, the area of a Run-time protector and a Restart-time protector is only 6.6% and 2% of a conventional router area respectively.

U2 - 10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936

DO - 10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84964788345

T3 - 2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015

BT - 2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT 2015): Proceedings

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015

Y2 - 10 July 2015 through 11 July 2015

ER -

Biswas AK, Nandy SK, Narayan R. Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT 2015): Proceedings . Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. 7383936. (2015 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies, CONECCT 2015). doi: 10.1109/CONECCT.2015.7383936

Network-on-chip router attacks and their prevention in MP-SoCs with multiple Trusted Execution Environments

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this