Abstract
Stable networks of order r where r is a natural number refer to those networks that are immune to coalitional deviation of size r or less. In this paper, we introduce stability of a finite order and examine its relation with efficient networks under anonymous and component additive value functions and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. In particular, we examine shapes of networks or network architectures that would resolve the conflict between stability and efficiency in the sense that if stable networks assume those shapes they would be efficient and if efficient networks assume those shapes, they would be stable with minimal further restrictions on value functions.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 1450010 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | International Game Theory Review |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 05 Jun 2014 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 01 Dec 2014 |
Keywords
- Stability of order r
- Efficiency
- Network architecture