Most cryptographic devices should inevitably have a resistance against the threat of side channel attacks. For this, masking and hiding schemes have been proposed since 1999. The security validation of these countermeasures is an ongoing research topic, as a wider range of new and existing attack techniques are tested against these countermeasures. This paper examines the side channel security of the balanced encoding countermeasure, whose aim is to process the secret key-related data under a constant Hamming weight and/or Hamming distance leakage. Unlike previous works, we assume that the leakage model coefficients conform to a normal distribution, producing a model with closer fidelity to real-world implementations. We perform analysis on the balanced encoded PRINCE block cipher with simulated leakage model and also an implementation on an AVR board. We consider both standard correlation power analysis (CPA) and bit-wise CPA. We confirm the resistance of the countermeasure against standard CPA, however, we find with a bit-wise CPA that we can reveal the key with only a few thousands traces.
|Title of host publication||Procceedings of 14th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference CARDIS 2015)|
|Number of pages||15|
|Publication status||Accepted - 2015|
|Event||14th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference - Bochum, Germany|
Duration: 04 Nov 2015 → 06 Nov 2015
|Conference||14th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference|
|Period||04/11/2015 → 06/11/2015|
- Balanced Encoding
- bit-wise CPA
- PRINCE block cipher
Won, Y-S., Hodgers, P., O'Neill, M., & Han, D-G. (Accepted/In press). On the Security of Balanced Encoding Countermeasures. In Procceedings of 14th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference CARDIS 2015) Springer.