Organizational Determinants of Bank Resilience: Explaining the Performance of SME Banks in the Dutch Financial Crisis of the 1920s

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Abstract

By the start of the twentieth century, the two organizational forms most used by Dutch banks to raise capital through the dispersal of their ownership were the cooperative association and the public company. Share ownership in cooperatives was typically restricted to customers, while companies permitted outside investors. Neither organizational form dictated specific shareholder liability arrangements. New specialist banks targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) combined these two organizational forms and flexible liability rules to create hybrid forms. I find those that took the public company form were more likely to suffer distress during the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s. Liability arrangements for shareholders, by contrast, had a negligible impact on these banks’ resilience.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)661-690
JournalBusiness History Review
Volume92
Issue number4 (Winter 2018)
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 07 Mar 2019

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Organizational form
Financial crisis
Resilience
Small and medium-sized enterprises
1920s
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Financial Crisis
Liability
Shareholders
Arrangement
Ownership
Distress
Liability rules
Investors
Share ownership
Targeting
20th century

Bibliographical note

Date of publication is March 2019; article appears in issue 4 of volume 2018.

Keywords

  • organizational forms
  • shareholder liability
  • banking crises
  • law and finance hypothesis
  • the Netherlands

Cite this

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