Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

Subhadip Chakrabarti, S. Beal, P. Solal, A. Ghintran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)338-356
Number of pages19
JournalGames
Volume1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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