Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

Subhadip Chakrabarti; S. Beal; P. Solal; A. Ghintran

doi:10.3390/g1030338

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

Subhadip Chakrabarti, S. Beal, P. Solal, A. Ghintran

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	338-356
Number of pages	19
Journal	Games
Volume	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030338
Publication status	Published - 2010

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title = "Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization",

abstract = "We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.",

author = "Subhadip Chakrabarti and S. Beal and P. Solal and A. Ghintran",

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doi = "10.3390/g1030338",

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journal = "Games",

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T1 - Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

AU - Chakrabarti, Subhadip

AU - Beal, S.

AU - Solal, P.

AU - Ghintran, A.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

AB - We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

U2 - 10.3390/g1030338

DO - 10.3390/g1030338

M3 - Article

VL - 1

SP - 338

EP - 356

JO - Games

JF - Games

SN - 2073-4336

ER -

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

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