Power Spectral Density Side-Channel Attack Overlapping Window Method

Philip Hodgers, Kean Hong Boey, Maire O'Neill

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cryptographic algorithms have been designed to be computationally secure, however it has been shown that when they are implemented in hardware, that these devices leak side channel information that can be used to mount an attack that recovers the secret encryption key. In this paper an overlapping window power spectral density (PSD) side channel attack, targeting an FPGA device running the Advanced Encryption Standard is proposed. This improves upon previous research into PSD attacks by reducing the amount of pre-processing (effort) required. It is shown that the proposed overlapping window method requires less processing effort than that of using a sliding window approach, whilst overcoming the issues of sampling boundaries. The method is shown to be effective for both aligned and misaligned data sets and is therefore recommended as an improved approach in comparison with existing time domain based correlation attacks.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication14th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design
Pages274-278
Number of pages5
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2011
Event14th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design - , Finland
Duration: 01 Sep 201101 Sep 2011

Conference

Conference14th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design
CountryFinland
Period01/09/201101/09/2011

Keywords

  • Power spectral density
  • Power analysis
  • side-channel attacks

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