Abstract
We describe a pre-processing correlation attack on an FPGA implementation of AES, protected with a random clocking countermeasure that exhibits complex variations in both the location and amplitude of the power consumption patterns of the AES rounds. It is demonstrated that the merged round patterns can be pre-processed to identify and extract the individual round amplitudes, enabling a successful power analysis attack. We show that the requirement of the random clocking countermeasure to provide a varying execution time between processing rounds can be exploited to select a sub-set of data where sufficient current decay has occurred, further improving the attack. In comparison with the countermeasure's estimated security of 3 million traces from an integration attack, we show that through application of our proposed techniques that the countermeasure can now be broken with as few as 13k traces.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2015 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 85-88 |
Number of pages | 4 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781479983919 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 27 May 2015 |
Event | IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2015 - Lisbon, Portugal Duration: 24 May 2015 → 27 May 2015 |
Conference
Conference | IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2015 |
---|---|
Country/Territory | Portugal |
City | Lisbon |
Period | 24/05/2015 → 27/05/2015 |
Keywords
- Power analysis
- random clocking countermeasure