Abstract
The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer's beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief--sensitivism--which allows such a solution. I sketch a sensitivist account of the preface writer's (consistent) doxastic state.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 363-381 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 98 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 03 Nov 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 07 Sep 2017 |
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Preface Writers Are Consistent'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Profiles
-
Roger Clarke
- School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics - Senior Lecturer
- Philosophy
Person: Academic